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Introduction 1
In recognizing the benefits of foreign bank entry -such as increased quality and availability of financial services, more competitive and efficient domestic banking markets, and the stimulation of bank supervisory and regulatory frameworks (Levine 1996) In this paper, "North" refers to high-income countries and "South" comprises low-and middle-income countries, i.e. developing countries, as defined by the World Bank (2010) . Also see Appendix A.
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Birte Pohl: 0 B Spillover and Competition Effects: Evidence from the sub-Saharan African Banking Sector This paper analyzes the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry on domestic banks in developing countries. From a theoretical perspective, domestic banks may be forced to operate more efficiently due to the competitive pressure from foreign entrants. They may also improve their efficiency by adopting modern foreign technologies. However, if foreign banks cherry-pick the most profitable and low-risk customers and force domestic banks to specialize in serving more risky customers, their efficiency may be reduced (Jeon et al. 2010) .
Empirical applications on the competition and spillover effects of foreign bank entry have produced conflicting findings. Using data from banks in a large sample of industrialized and developing countries, Claessens et al. (2001) find that foreign bank entry is negatively associated with domestic banksʹ net interest margins and overhead costs, and thus enhances the efficiency of the domestic banking market. In contrast, Hermes and Lensink (2002) find a positive relationship between foreign bank entry and domestic banksʹ margins in low-income countries. The authors argue that foreign banks crowd out domestic banks, which then enter other market segments where they subsequently increase their net interest margins through greater market power. Domestic banksʹ costs increase in the short term as they adopt the costly modern technologies of foreign entrants. In another article, Lensink and Hermes (2004) show that foreign bank entry is related to higher net interest margins and overhead costs of domestic banks only in countries with lower levels of economic development. At higher levels, banking markets are more competitive and spillover effects are less important.
These findings suggest that the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry depend on the host countriesʹ level of economic development. Little is known, however, about the importance of the origin of the foreign investor. This paper adds to the findings of previous studies and distinguishes between the potential efficiency effects emanated by foreign banks hosted in industrialized countries and foreign banks from developing countries. To do this, changes in the efficiency of domestic banks in 17 low-income countries in AfricaF 3 F during the period 1999-2006 are considered. By augmenting data on North-South and South-South bank presence, the effects of regional and non-regional South-South banks are further differentiated. The results indicate that North-South banks do not induce competitive pressure on domestic banks. However, domestic banks may benefit from spillover effects from North-South banks. The findings also reflect that South-South banks induce spillover effects, but there are ambiguous results with regard to the competition effects on domestic banks. In contrast, regional South-South banks seem to enhance domestic banksʹ efficiency both through spillover and competition effects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical literature and expresses the expected effects of North-South and South-South bank entry.
Section 3 describes the underlying dataset of the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the 7 model specification, discusses the methodology and reports the main results as well as those of the sensitivity analysis. The final section 5 summarizes the findings of the paper.
B 2 Related Literature
Theories of multinational banks (MNBs) (see, for example, Cho 1985 , Dunning 1989 posit that the foreign subsidiaries of MNBs have technological advantages (broadly defined as product, process and distribution technology, management and marketing skills) over domestic banks in developing countries. These advantages allow them to outweigh the costs associated with institutional and cultural differences as well as spatial distance and consumer preferences in foreign markets (Hymer 1976) . Thus, generally, foreign banks operate at higher levels of efficiency compared to domestic banks and may force the latter to become more efficient to retain their market shares.
Distinguishing between foreign banks headquartered in industrialized countries and foreign banks from developing countries, Petrou (2007) argues that these types of banks differ from each other with regard to their levels of capability: According to the author, foreign banks from industrialized countries have the capital, reputation, modern practices and technologies to enter foreign markets according to risk-diversification and profit opportunities. In contrast, foreign banks from developing countries have fewer resources and skill-sets and therefore tend to follow clients from their home country.
Depending on their competitive advantages, foreign banks from industrialized and developing countries may serve different market segments. Industrialized country banks may mainly exploit their advantages in serving low-risk and profitable customers -such as large, export-oriented companies or multinational corporations. But they may lack the necessary soft information and relationship lending techniques for financing less transparent small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and their mechanical rules and procedures established in more advanced environments (Honohan/Beck 2007) may not be appropriate.
Foreign banks from developing countries may be restricted to serving particular market niches in which they are best equipped with proprietary client information, expertise and reputation.
However, a report by UNCTAD (2006) suggests that developing country multinationals derive their competitive advantages from a wider range of sources than has traditionally been assumed. For the banking sector, the report implies that foreign banks from developing countries are characterized by the following sources of competitive advantages: First, they possess bank-specific advantages such as appropriate and specialized expertise and technology, distribution and service capabilities and specific business models. Second, they derive some advantages stemming from the home country environment which include access to funds and cultural affinity. Advantages stemming from the development process, or 8 Birte Pohl: 0 B Spillover and Competition Effects: Evidence from the sub-Saharan African Banking Sector the stage of development, comprise cheap and adapted products and services as well as institutional affinity.
The terms "affinity", "adaptation" and "appropriateness" indicate that foreign banks from developing countries may not be able to exploit their advantages on a global scale, but only in other developing countries. Additionally, the regional concentration of FDI in banking markets (World Bank 2006) implies that their advantages only apply on a regional scale. But within regional markets, South-South banks may be able to serve broader market segments instead of concentrating on particular market niches, as they have experience with the specific regional business practices, consumer characteristics and demands. This may put them into the position to expand their business focus on underserved market segments such as retail and SME banking. The operations of non-regional South-South banks may in contrast be restricted to particular market niches.
The following generalized banking market structure in developing countries may thus be expected: Even if domestic banks have generally more experience in local markets, the superiority of North-South banks in the wholesale segment may force them out of the market. As a consequence, domestic banks may focus on other target markets where they face less competitive pressure from North-South banks. This may also limit the scope for North-South spillover effects as the technologies and lending practices applied in the wholesale segment may not be suitable for other market segments. Hence, we expect that the market entry of North-South banks does not force domestic banks to improve efficiency.
In contrast, regional South-South banks and domestic banks may more often specialize in the same market segments. Regional South-South banks may not be superior and may not squeeze domestic banks out of the market, but they may force them to increase efficiency.
Additionally, we expect that domestic banks benefit from spillover effects from regional South-South banks, which may also allow them to reach a higher efficiency. The concentration of non-regional South-South banks on market niches implies that non-regional South-South banks are not in direct competition with domestic banks. Hence, we expect that non-regional South-South banks do not have efficiency-enhancing effects on domestic banks.
B 3 Data
To test for North-South and South-South efficiency effects, accounting data from domestic banks in 17 low-income countries in Africa (see Appendix A, Table A) during the period from 1999 to 2006 is used. Next to data on North-South and South-South bank presence, industryand country-specific variables are also included in the analysis. X Table 1X includes a description and the sources of the data presented in the following sections.
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Efficiency Proxies
All bank-specific variables are from the Bureau van Dijksʹ Bankscope database -the most comprehensive and standardized database of bank-specific accounting data allowing for comparisons in a cross-country setting. To capture the extent of competitive pressure from foreign entrants changes of domestic banksʹ net margin are considered. This variable is defined as interest income minus interest expense (net interest income) divided by total earning assets.
To analyze whether there are spillover effects from foreign banks on domestic banks, two alternative proxies of bank efficiency -costs and the cost/income ratio -are used as the dependent variable. Costs are defined as overhead costs (personnel expenses, other noninterest expenses) to total assets and capture variations in wages and employment, managerial efficiency, product as well as service mix and quality (Demirgüç-Kunt/Huizinga 1999). The cost/income ratio is defined as overhead costs divided by the sum of net interest revenue and non-interest income.
X Table 2X compares the efficiency of different groups of banks (domestic and foreign, domestic and South-South, domestic and North-South, South-South and North-South, regional South-South and non-regional South-South). A t-test is used to check whether the means of the two populations in each group are the same. Pairs of entries that are significantly different from each other are set in boldface. The comparison shows that domestic banks and foreign banks do not significantly differ with respect to the three efficiency proxies. In contrast, domestic banksʹ net margin is significantly higher than SouthSouth banksʹ net margin. The costs and the cost/income ratio of domestic banks are significantly lower compared to South-South banks. North-South banks have significantly lower costs 10 Birte Pohl: 0 B Spillover and Competition Effects: Evidence from the sub-Saharan African Banking Sector than domestic banks. While there are no significant differences between the net margin of South-South and North-South banks, the costs and the cost/income ratio of South-South banks are significantly higher. These results may reflect that North-South banks more often concentrate on the wholesale segment, while South-South banks serve the SME segment, where risks and costs are higher. The net margin of regional South-South banks is significantly smaller than that of non-regional South-South banks, reflecting their higher efficiency. The costs of non-regional South-South banks are significantly higher compared to those of regional South-South banks, perhaps because non-regional South-South banks face greater informational disadvantages in African countries. Table 3X shows that the average presence of foreign banks as well as North-South banks is slightly overestimated.
However, the sum of the shares of regional and non-regional South-South banks is comparable to the share of South-South banks calculated by Claessens et al. (2008) . X Table 3X points out that the presence of regional South-South banks is more important than of nonregional investors in the sample of African countries. Next to data on foreign bank presence, bank-, industry-and country-specific control variables are included in the regressions. The first bank-specific control variable is bank size and is measured by the log of total assets. Despite the small scale of African financial systems (Beck et al. 2009 ), banks may benefit from economies of scale (Flamini et al. 2009 ). In order to account for a possible non-linear relationship, i.e. diseconomies of scale, the square of the log of total assets (size 2 ) also serves as a control variable. The ratio of equity to total assets (capital) is used to account for the capitalization of domestic banks. Banks in Africa are confronted with high credit risks, because of insufficient legal frameworks, creditor rights and borrower information (Flamini et al. 2009 ). Credit risk is captured by the ratio of loanloss provisions to loans (risk). Fee-based activities are generally less risky than interestearning activities (Flamini et al. 2009 ). The ratio of non-interest income to total assets (fee income) is used to control for different income sources. Differences in bank assets are reflected by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (liquidity) (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2004 ).
Market share is measured by individual banksʹ assets to total assets of the banking sector (share). Summary statistics of all bank-specific variables are provided in X Table X C.1 in Appendix C.
To control for the macro-economic environment in each host country, the annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (growth) and the annual growth rate of should be used to choose between them. This efficiency is determined by the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge 2006) . While the FE estimator should be preferred if the latter are serially uncorrelated, the FD estimator is more efficient under the assumption of no serial correlation. A test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the FD estimator is the more efficient.F 8 The test is similar to a Hausman test (Hausman 1987) , but has the advantage of still being applicable in the event of heteroskedastic and clustered errors (Schaffer/Stillman 2006) , which are used to correct for heteroskedasticity and within-bank serial correlation.
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The test uses the relation that under the null of no serial correlation, the residuals from the regression of the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5. Table 6 suggest a u-shaped relationship between size and the cost/income ratio and thus diseconomies of scale of banks that are too large. The regression results of the FD estimation have a greater explanatory power as indicated by the higher R 2 , and are more efficient as a test of autocorrelation reveals.
Overall, the findings with regard to the dependent variables costs and the cost/income ratio indicate that foreign banks induce spillover effects of modern technology on domestic banks.
These spillover effects seem to emanate mainly from regional South-South banks and may be explained by the better applicability of their technologies to domestic banking markets.
However, the results thus far may be driven by certain countries or groups of countries.
Moreover, the efficiency of domestic banks may be determined more by the prevailing governance environment than foreign bank presence. 
.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the baseline results are robust when tested against alternative sub-samples and additional control variables. If FD is applied as estimation method, the number of bank observations reduces considerably because the panel data is highly unbalanced. In order to enhance the comparability with the FE results, the sample of observations used in the FD estimation is estimated with the FE estimator. For all efficiency proxies, the results of the FE estimation of the smaller sample show few differences with regard to the baseline results (see X Table 7X , Table 8X and Table 9X ). In Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo, the presence of foreign banks measured in numbers is constant over the sample period. To check whether the baseline results are sensitive to an inclusion of these countries, countries with a constant share of foreign banks measured in numbers are excluded from the regressions. As the FD estimations are preferred over the FE estimations, only the results for the FD regressions are presented. For the dependent variable net margin the regression results are not very sensitive to an exclusion of countries with a constant share of foreign banks to total banks over the sample period. Regional South-South banks seem to put downward pressure on domestic banksʹ net margin (X Table 10X ). In Table 11X the results for the dependent variable costs are presented. If countries with a constant presence of foreign banks are excluded from the estimations, there is no significant association between the share of regional South-South banks and costs. In contrast, there is a positive and significant relation between the presence of regional South-South banks and the cost/income ratio (Table 12X ) . Moreover, the results presented in Section 4.2 may be driven by countries with a large number of domestic banks compared to other countries. As Kenya accounts for about onethird of the bank-year observations, the country is excluded in the following FD regressions.
Overall, the results presented in Section 4.2 do not seem to be sensitive to an exclusion of Kenyan banksʹ observations for all dependent variables net margin (X Table 13X ), costs (X Table 14X ) and cost/income ratio (X Table 15X ).
In order to analyze whether the variables net margin, costs and cost/income ratio are determined more by policy factors relating to the institutional conditions in a country than by foreign bank presence, the following FD regressions include governance as an explanatory variable. The results presented in X Table 16X show that for both measures of foreign bank presence governance is insignificant. Attending to the estimation results for the dependent variable costs shows that a better governance environment allows domestic banks to cut overhead costs (X Table 17X ). A better governance environment is also negatively -but 22
Birte Pohl: 0 B Spillover and Competition Effects: Evidence from the sub-Saharan African Banking Sector hardly significantly -associated with domestic banksʹ cost/income ratio of domestic banks (X Table 18X ). Overall, the results suggest that cross-country investments of regional South-South banks should be facilitated through harmonized regulation and financial reporting.
However, given the limited availability of ownership and bank-specific data and the shortterm perspective of this study, the results have to be treated with caution. Qualitative data with regard to the characteristics and strategies of banks operating in Africa would have given further insights into the banking market structure in African countries. Moreover, more research is needed concerning the effects of North-South and South-South banks on local legal and supervisory frameworks. Several sources are used to determine the ownership structure of the sampled banks.
First, Bankscope provides ownership information for a limited number of banks in the sample. However, ownership information is far from complete. In order to complement the shareholder inquiry, miscellaneous other sources aside from Bankscope had to be used.
Second, whenever available, data from the homepages and the annual reports of individual banks were consulted. If no information was available from these sources, several other, country-specific studies were used. Third, the shareholder data is supplemented and controlled by different general studies about the banking markets of African countries. If shareholder information was only available for two years with gaps in between (such as 2002 and 2005), and no information was available for the other years of the sample period, the available ownership structure was also assumed for the years with missing information.
Reports or information from web pages about the history of each respective bank was used to check whether these assumptions are reasonable. Furthermore, the data was checked against the available shareholder data in Bankscope and the data on foreign bank presence provided by Claessens et al. (2008) . Overall, a vast number of consistency and plausibility checks were executed in order to obtain a reliable dataset. The initial aim was to collect information on the shareholder structures of all reporting banks in 24 low-income countries in Africa (with more than five active banks in 2006) covering the period 1995-2006. However, especially for some small and dissolved banks, the shareholder structure could not be determined for any year of the sample period. These banks were dropped from the sample, but only comprise ten observations. The scarcity of ownership data limits the sample period 
